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While it is commonly accepted that the main cause of child labour is
poverty, empirical observations suggest that economic growth is not al-
ways associated with the reduction in child labour. We show, in a dual
economy framework, that the e⁄ect of productivity growth upon child
labour may be positive or negative. In particular, changes in the pro-
ductivity gap between the modern and the traditional sectors, due to the
technological progress, can generate an increase in child labour. In a dy-
namic version of the model we also investigate how this e⁄ect depends on
the quality of schooling.
1 Introduction
International evidence indicates that the labour participation rates of children
have decreased across the world between 1950 and 2000, bringing the world
average down from 27.6% in 1950 to 11.3% in 2000; in Europe, the fall has
brought the child labour participation rate down to 0.04% and in India child
labour participation rates decreased from 35.43% to 12.07% during this period
(ILO, 2004). According to Hagemann et al. (2006), the proportion of chil-
dren between ages 5 and 14 involved in productive activities, including unpaid
household work, fell from 17.6% in 2000 to 15.8% in 2004. While this trend
is observed simultaneously with economic growth in less developed countries,
whether, and how, economic growth is causing the decrease in the number of
working children is still unclear. With child labour being popularly considered
to result from poverty, many policy makers, reviewing such international ev-
idence, argue that the best panacea for child labour is economic growth (see
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1Weiner (1991) for the context in which this argument is put forward in India).
However, few studies have explicitly analysed the way in which growth might
decrease child labour. There is therefore very little information regarding the
length of time that it may take for growth to have an e⁄ect or even the channels
through which it may operate. Thus, growth may decrease child work directly
by increasing household incomes but it may also in￿ uence the infrastructure
and the environment in which the child lives. At the same time, growth may
shift the demand for labour, including child labour, and the overall e⁄ect may,
in fact, be an increase in the amount of child labour employed.
In this paper we present a model of child labour in a dual economy and com-
pare its predictions with the observed patterns of child labour across regions in
India. Our preliminary analysis, presented in the paper, draws on the Indian
National Sample Survey (NSS) data for 3 years ￿1983, 1993 and 2004. India
provides a good case in which to study these issues because levels of prosper-
ity and rates of growth vary signi￿cantly across the country. In addition, the
1983-2004 period was the one in which India undertook considerable reforms
of her economy and, hence, these years encompass a range of institutional and
economic changes.
Despite the decrease in the number of children working across the world,
approximately 12% of 10-14 year olds were working in India in 2000 (ILO,
2004). Child labour a⁄ects the level of child schooling as well as the perfor-
mance of children in school. Schooling, in turn, is an investment good that will
in￿ uence a child￿ s earning capability as an adult and therefore will determine
inter-generational economic and social mobility.
The uno¢ cial position in India with regard to child labour is that growth
will ￿lter down into employment and incomes, and this will reduce the neces-
sity for the poor to send children to work (Weiner, 1991, p.13). However, the
observed patterns suggest that this does not always happen, and even if it does,
the process takes a long time. If growth lifts the employment constraints on
households, it might make the incidence of child labour more likely. Growth
can also result in disproportionate changes across sectors, with the result that
the pervasiveness of child labour increases in low-skill sectors and among low-
income households. Finally, it is possible that children work not because their
parents are poor but because schools are not good enough, so that parents see
no bene￿t from education for their children. Identifying which of these factors
prevails is important because it will determine which policy is likely to achieve
a decrease in child work.
1.1 Literature
The in￿ uence of macroeconomic performance on child labour and schooling
has attracted considerable attention in the literature (Grootaert and Patrinos,
1999; Swaminathan, 1998; Neri and Thomas, 2001; Kak, 2004; Weiner, 1991).
There is also a large historical literature which accepts that ￿ the early phase
of industrialisation, during the 18th and 19th centuries, brought an increased
reliance on child labour￿(Heywood, 1988; p.132) though trend was subsequently
2reversed.
The relationship between child labour and growth has also been studied in
various theoretical frameworks. Hussain and Maskus (2003), for instance, relate
the dynamics of child labour to human capital accumulation through schooling.
Strulik (2004) includes fertility choice and child survival thus relating economic
growth and child labour to a demographic transition. Hazan and Berdugo (2002)
modelling child labour and fertility decisions in the context of economic growth
argue that in the early stages of development, the economy is in a ￿ development
trap￿in which child labour is abundant, fertility is high and output per capita
is low. With technological progress, adult wages increase relative to child wages
and the resultant income and substitution e⁄ects induce parents to send children
to school instead of work and therefore also to decrease the number of children
they have. This leads to further economic growth and further decreases in child
work. Chaudhuri and Dwibedi (2007) use a dual economy approach to inves-
tigate the e⁄ect on child labour of an expansion of foreign capital investment,
as well as the e⁄ect of taxes and education subsidies. Recently, Basu and Bar
(2009) examined the e⁄ect of an increase in a household￿ s land ownership on
child labor. They showed that increases in land initially lead to increased child
labor, but as land continues to increase child labor declines. The possibility
of an inverted-U relationship between land holdings and child labor was also
explored theoretically and tested empirically in Basu, Das, and Dutta (2009).
In addition, there have been empirical studies that have considered this re-
lationship in di⁄erent countries across the world. Edmonds and Pavcnik (2002),
considering the impact of trade liberalisation on child labour in Vietnam, ￿nd
large reductions in child labour associated with increases in the relative price
of rice, the major component of Vietnam￿ s exports. Swaminathan (1998) in a
study of a prosperous and fast growing region of India ￿Gujarat - ￿nds that
growth is associated with an increase in child labour. Torres (2003) ￿nds that
while per capita GDP is negatively correlated with child labour there is no corre-
lation between growth performance and changes in child labour. Thus, economic
growth does not automatically reduce children￿ s participation in labour force.
Further analysis of the role of education in reducing child labour shows that the
quality of education matters more than the quantity.
Kambhampati and Rajan (2005) ￿nd that there is some evidence of a quadratic
relationship between the probability of a child being employed and regional eco-
nomic growth in India in 1993. They found, for example, that Bihar (at a very
low level of development) and Kerala (at a relatively high level of development)
had similarly low levels of child work, though in Kerala this was accompanied
by very high levels of child schooling. Thus, Bihar seemed to be a ￿ low￿oppor-
tunity state, while Kerala seemed to be a ￿ high￿opportunity state. The analysis
of the 2004 data shows that child labour is negatively correlated with the adult
unemployment, which also suggest that more children is employed in the regions
with higher economic opportunities. Kak (2004), in a study of child labour in
India, tries to explain the ￿ persistence of child labour in a period when unem-
ployment levels for adult workers are increasing￿ . He argues that the demand
for children in the labour market occurs not because of labour shortages but
3because of the characteristics of the labour market which is segmented by caste,
gender and class divisions ￿ which provide distinct spheres for participation of
children in the labour force￿(Kak, 2004, p.46). Basu et al (2003) argue that
￿ the demand side factors (of child labour) are not observable and have earlier
been ignored￿so that ￿ all the data available to us as well as those used in earlier
empirical studies on this topic relate to the supply side of child labour￿(Basu
et al, 2003, p.11). The authors correct for this by including village level ￿xed
e⁄ects which proxy for the impact of regional prosperity on household incomes,
infrastructure and on opportunities for employment.
Overall, there seems to be strong evidence in the current literature that eco-
nomic growth does not necessarily reduce child labour. The traditional notion
that economic growth will decrease child labour highlights the impact that such
growth will have on household incomes and therefore on the supply of child
workers. However, growth may also in￿ uence many of the above factors, ei-
ther directly or indirectly. Thus, while economic growth decreases the supply
of child workers, it also increases the demand for child workers, at least in the
short run. The overall e⁄ect is ambiguous. In this paper we demostrate how in
a dual economy framework growth in productivity can generate an increase in
child labour in equilibrium because the e⁄ect of the demand side of the economy
dominates that of the supply side.
1.2 Child labour trends in India
Studies done on the 1993 NSS concluded that though child work was relatively
low (about 5-8%) on average in India, it was increasing with growth instead
of decreasing (Kambhampati and Rajan, 2006). In addition to this, a number
of studies found that the category of children who were recorded as not doing
anything i.e. the ￿ idle￿category was very high across states in India. In most
cases, it was the second largest category ￿after child schooling. This led to
many writers to conjecture that these children were simply waiting for jobs (i.e.
were being rationed on the job front) or did not have schools to go to. If this
were true, then child work would increase with growth over time and across
regions and the ￿ none￿category would become smaller.
Analysing data from 2 rounds of the National Sample Survey of India - 1993
and 2004, we ￿nd that there has been a large increase in the proportion of
children in work between 1993 and 2004 (see Tables 1 and 2). The tables are
based on two activity status variables:
￿ Usual Principal Activity Status which indicates the main activity that the
person is engaged in;
￿ Usual Subsidiary Activity Status, which indicates whether children are
doing more than one activity;
￿Work (for those who are primarily engaged in work),
￿School (for those who are primarily engaged in schooling),
4￿Chores (for those who are mainly engaged in doing household chores),
￿SCHWRK (those who state their main activity as schooling and sub-
sidiary activity as work)and
￿None (those who are not identi￿ed as doing any of these activities).
In many states like Assam, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh, this proportion
has increased more than 12 times. In addition, there has been a signi￿cant
increase in the proportion of children doing chores (from less than 1-2% in 1993
to more than 10% by 2004). Finally, the proportion of children primarily going
to school but also working has seen a very large increase from less than 1% in
1993 to over 10% in 2004. There has also been a signi￿cant and concomitant
decrease in the proportion of children in school in most states. This is sur-
prising given that other studies indicated that schooling ￿gures in India have
improved considerably. To check whether there was a problem, we reconsidered
our de￿nitions of variables.
We found that that between 61-90% (across di⁄erent states) attended school
in 1993 but this increased to above 92% in all states by 2004 if we look at a di⁄er-
ent schooling variable (current attendance). This variable includes children who
are studying part-time, by postal tuition etc., and not only those who state their
principal activity as being schooling. On the other hand, the Schooling status
variable (which is reported in the table) only includes those who state that their
main activity is going to school. The change in trends over the decade therefore
seems to indicate that while fewer children state their principal activity status
as schooling, the vast majority of children are obtaining an education of some
sort. This could be because in a growing economy employment opportunities
increase and poor households cannot a⁄ord to ignore these opportunities. The
numbers of children who are involved in both school and work (multi-tasking)
have increased.
52004 - Girls 1993 - Girls
16.38 9.92 26.34 41.33 22.41 0.35 23.93 10.39 63.83 1.85 West Bengal
22.08 10.76 22.46 41.65 25.13 0.44 31.28 17.49 48.96 2.28 Uttar
5.43 8.01 22.32 47.60 22.07 0.00 12.78 4.54 81.36 1.31 Tripura
13.32 4.54 11.48 54.29 29.70 0.67 6.91 7.58 79.15 6.36 Tamil Nadu
19.29 3.54 10.44 49.56 36.46 0.00 6.50 5.69 85.77 2.03 Sikkim
22.06 9.84 16.26 40.16 33.74 0.67 34.20 14.63 35.30 15.88 Rajasthan
25.34 8.68 29.82 42.49 19.00 0.08 14.81 12.70 72.25 0.24 Punjab
18.03 11.27 19.78 41.11 27.84 0.30 25.85 12.05 58.79 3.31 Orissa
38.41 3.43 7.41 53.09 36.08 0.00 5.60 1.70 91.73 0.97 Nagaland
5.62 1.83 10.67 45.93 41.57 0.69 8.65 0.00 87.54 3.81 Mizoram
13.34 5.39 4.04 48.10 42.47 1.56 19.06 7.63 69.32 3.99 Meghalaya
20.07 5.96 16.13 46.01 31.90 0.95 11.02 1.90 85.99 1.09 Manipur
17.52 7.92 12.29 49.94 29.86 0.55 13.58 6.47 76.56 3.39 Maharastra
14.90 10.29 14.73 44.32 30.66 0.71 35.91 12.56 47.35 4.18 Madhya
16.87 11.41 19.07 51.43 18.09 0.15 3.58 1.57 94.33 0.52 Kerala
13.87 6.97 13.25 46.24 33.54 1.18 14.99 11.81 67.30 5.90 Karnataka
29.23 7.31 22.00 46.23 24.46 0.99 16.72 11.09 67.88 4.30 J&K
29.00 6.28 8.95 51.20 33.56 12.74 9.59 2.99 82.04 5.37 Himachal
23.61 10.63 21.53 45.32 22.52 0.38 21.03 10.83 67.63 0.50 Haryana
20.83 7.87 20.57 43.65 27.92 0.50 22.03 15.19 60.98 1.80 Gujarat
14.32 18.35 23.37 38.55 19.74 0.02 40.59 14.82 43.56 1.04 Bihar
21.07 6.70 19.40 50.09 23.81 0.60 20.42 5.04 73.59 0.95 Assam
2.20 10.39 9.49 40.96 39.16 0.61 29.95 6.76 58.37 4.92 Arunachal
16.29 6.00 9.94 49.87 34.20 0.34 21.90 11.46 57.79 8.85 Andhra
schwrk none chores school Work Schwrk None Chores School Work
Table 1: Occupational choices for girls (Source: NSS 1993 and 2004)
616.47 9.92 26.29 41.11 22.69 1.16 22.45 0.58 72.10 4.87 West Bengal
23.15 9.85 20.98 43.75 25.42 1.91 22.25 0.68 72.10 4.98 Uttar Pradesh
5.47 8.53 23.79 45.37 22.32 0.20 13.80 0.30 83.80 2.10 Tripura
11.48 4.26 11.54 55.31 28.89 0.88 7.62 0.28 86.87 5.24 Tamil Nadu
18.02 4.06 7.14 50.16 38.64 0.35 6.69 0.70 90.49 2.11 Sikkim
23.24 8.31 15.89 42.67 33.13 2.26 17.18 0.43 74.25 8.14 Rajasthan
28.99 6.29 26.10 46.32 21.29 0.21 12.46 0.14 83.04 4.36 Punjab
16.01 10.02 21.95 39.00 29.03 0.60 20.53 0.79 71.22 7.46 Orissa
35.31 3.15 6.41 51.75 38.69 0.47 6.53 0.00 92.31 1.17 Nagaland
3.04 4.14 10.50 41.57 43.78 0.90 13.21 0.60 81.68 4.50 Mizoram
15.21 3.92 3.23 47.47 45.39 1.02 19.35 2.72 72.50 5.43 Meghalaya
22.09 4.45 16.72 48.85 29.98 1.24 10.79 0.14 88.38 0.69 Manipur
17.43 6.63 9.96 49.28 34.13 1.16 10.06 0.11 86.18 3.66 Maharastra
13.09 10.93 15.41 43.21 30.44 2.08 25.12 0.93 66.07 7.88 Madhya Pradesh
20.31 12.42 19.14 49.38 19.07 0.07 5.37 0.15 94.04 0.44 Kerala
14.48 7.38 13.03 47.66 31.93 2.82 12.82 0.63 78.39 8.16 Karnataka
29.19 5.73 23.45 45.93 24.89 2.71 11.90 0.30 82.68 5.12 J&K
26.95 5.35 8.46 48.26 37.94 15.48 6.16 0.24 91.31 2.29 Himachal Pr
22.17 9.18 21.22 44.42 25.18 0.33 14.54 0.11 83.17 2.19 Haryana
17.19 5.63 18.36 47.04 28.97 0.52 18.41 0.33 77.20 4.06 Gujarat
14.85 14.85 22.50 41.32 21.34 0.31 30.43 1.82 64.35 3.40 Bihar
18.55 5.99 19.60 46.89 27.52 1.30 18.46 0.39 78.28 2.87 Assam
2.48 10.02 9.35 43.87 36.75 0.42 23.98 5.64 66.57 3.81 Arunachal Pr.
14.95 6.18 10.05 49.57 34.20 1.35 13.96 0.41 73.69 11.95 Andhra
Scwr
k none chores School Childwr
scwr
k none chores school Childwrk State_name
2004 - Boys 1993 - Boys
Table 2: Occupational choices for boys (Source: NSS 1993 and 2004)
The tables also indicate that the highest proportion of children working in
2004 is in the North East states of Arunachal, Meghalaya and Mizoram. In all
these states, there was between 36% and 46% of children working. This region
also has the highest percentage of children in school, with 52% of boys and 53%
of girls attending school in Nagaland. In other states in the region, it was above
45% for girls and above 44% for boys. The highest proportion of boys and girls
doing chores are in Punjab (26% for boys and 29% for girls), Bihar (22% for
boys and 23% for girls), Bengal, UP and Tripura. The largest proportion of
children doing nothing is in Bihar (15% of boys and 18% of girls). Nagaland
has the highest proportion of children (38% of girls and 35% of boys) going
to school and also working (SCHWORK). Thus, the North East seems to be
the region where there is more work and more schooling. The state of Bihar
continues to lag behind in having a very high proportion of children neither at
work nor at school.
7These patterns of increasing children￿ s time both at school and at work
associated with economic growth is the main focus of our theoretical model.
We show how these patterns can be generated by increasing demand for child
labour as well as increasing return to education that a⁄ects the productivity of
children as adult workers in the future.
2 Child labour in a dual economy
In this section we present a model of child labour in a dual economy. The dual
economy framework in the growth literature was pioneered by Arthur Lewis
(1954) and Simon Kuznets (1955), and has been extensively developed in many
directions (see Temple (2005) for a recent discussion). We follow the conven-
tional setup and model the economic growth as an exogenous increase in total
factor productivity, or the technological progress (thus abstracting from the en-
dogenous sources of growth). While we use a static framework, it still allows
to model the e⁄ect of economic growth on child labour by analyzing how the
equilibrium amount of child labour changes when the productivity increases due
to technological changes.
Our model economy consists of a production sector that produces a ho-
mogenous good with labour as an only input, and a representative household
that supplies labour to the production sector and consumes the output. The
household consists of adults and children. The preferences of the household are
described by the utility function, U (X;lA;lC), where X is the aggregate con-
sumption, and lA;C is the amount of leisure enjoyed by the adult members of
the household and the children, respectively.
The production side is inhabited by ￿rms of two types, modern and tra-
ditional. For simplicity we assume that there is only one ￿rm of each type;
extending the analysis to many ￿rms will not a⁄ect the main result. The mod-
ern ￿rm employs only the adult labour, - perhaps, because the the modern
production process is too hazardous, or because there is a ban on children em-
ployment in the industrialized sector. The traditional ￿rm can employ both
adults and children. The adult workers are perfectly mobile between the two
sectors and are more e¢ cient than child workers. The production technology
has constant returns to scale, and the ￿rms are owned by the household.
2.1 Producers
The modern (M) and the traditional (T) ￿rms take the wages of adult workers,
wA (per unit e¢ ciency), and the wages of child workers, wC, as given and
compete in quantities. We assume the following for the production technology
in this sector:
qM = AMSNM; qT = AT [￿(SNA)
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)N
￿
C]
1=￿ ; ￿ ￿ 1
with AT < AM. Parameters AT and AM re￿ ect the level of technology in
each sector. An alternative interpretation is that both ￿rms use a ￿xed capital
8input, with the level of capital being higher in the modern ￿rm. Parameter
S > 1 re￿ ects the e¢ ciency of adult labour input relative to the child labour
input. Larger ￿ corresponds to the higher degree of substitutability between
the adult labour and the child labour inputs in the traditional sector (￿ = 0
gives the Cobb-Douglas production function), and ￿ (1￿￿) is the share of adult
(child) labour in this sector. Here we assume the relative e¢ ciency of the adult
labour exogenously ￿xed; in the next section it will be determined endogenously,
as an outcome of the investment in education.
The interior solution to the cost minimization problem gives the demand for





























!; ! ￿ wA=wC: (4)






; i = T;M; (5)
where Q = qT + qM is the total output, and p is the price.
2.2 Household
Assume that the utility function of the household has the following form:
U (X;lA;lC) = lnX + ￿lnlC + (1 ￿ ￿)lnlA: (6)
The total income of the household is
I = wASLA + wCLC + ￿T + ￿M; (7)
where LA;C is the labour supply of the adults and children, respectively, and
￿T;M is the pro￿t of the traditional and the modern sector. Normalizing the
total time endowment of the adults and that of children to unity, and focussing
on the interior solution to the household￿ s optimization problem,
maxU (X;lA;lC) s.t. pX ￿ I; lA;C + LA;C ￿ 1
one obtains for the consumption demand and for the labour supply the following
expressions:
pX = I; LC = 1 ￿
￿
wC




92.3 Equilibrium with child labour
In this section we assume that the parameters are such that the optimal solution
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(1 ￿ ￿)(1 +  )
2 +  (2 ￿ 1=￿)
￿(1 +  )
2 +  =￿
(11)
The details are provided in the Appendix. In general, the solution cannot be
written in an analytical form, even for the Cobb-Douglas case.
2.4 Growth and child labour
We model economic growth as an increase in the total factor productivity. We
consider the case when the productivity in the traditional sector remains con-
stant whereas the productivity in the modern sector grows, i.e. ￿ increases. The




the horizontal axis and L￿
C on the vertical axis. In all simulations ￿ = ￿ = 1=2.
The results are robust to the changes in the parameter values in a fairly wide
range.
Thus, when the technological progress results in a shrinking productivity
gap between the traditional and the modern sector the equilibrium amount of
child labour grows. A positive relationship between child labour and growth can
be caused by the improvement of technology and productivity in the traditional
sector growing faster relative to that in the modern sector. Conversely, if the
productivity in the modern sector grows faster, the equlibrium child labour falls.
This illustrates that the relationship between growth induced by technological
progress and the child labour is ambiguous, with the sign of the e⁄ect driven
by the labour demand. Note that possible reversals in the response of child
labour to economic growth iare driven by the demand and do not rely on a
backward-bending labour supply curve, as in the luxury axiom explanation.
In this model we imposed the di⁄erence in the e¢ ciencies between the adult
and the child labour and have abstracted from the role of education and the
e⁄ect of economic growth on the returns to education. The analysis of the role
of education in skill formation and the choice between sending children to work
or to school is undertaken in the next section.
103 Education and child labour
We now extend our model by introducing time and an alternative use of the
adults￿and children￿ s time, apart from leisure and paid work. Speci￿cally, we
consider a two-period overlapping generations economy where in every period
adults and children spend part of their time not in paid work on ￿skill produc-
tion￿ . One can think of a child￿ s time in skill production as merely growing up
and developing basic skills, or time spent at school, with either of these a⁄ecting
the child￿ s labour productivity as an adult in the future. An adult￿ s time in skill
production can be viewed as the aggregate time cost of parenting, teaching basic
skills to the child, helping with school work,etc. An alternative interpretation
of the skill production is possible, ￿this could be production of necessities, such
as basic food, within the household, and not for sale in the market. The output
is consumed entirely by the members of the household, and higher levels of this
consumption results in higher productivity of children when they grow up, as
an e⁄ect, say, of better nutrition (similar to the approach in Genicot, 2005.)
A household in time period t consists of an adult, or a parent, born in
the beginning of period t ￿ 1, and a child born in the beginning of period t.
The adult cares about the future wellbeing of the child; we model this as a
non-paternalistic altruism, so that the adult￿ s preferences are described by the
utility function of the form





where the instantaneous utility function is similar to (6),
Ut = U (Xt;lAt;lCt) = lnXt + ￿lnlCt + (1 ￿ ￿)lnlAt:
The parent decides how much of his own time and his child￿ s time will be invested
in paid work (LAt and LCt)and in skill production (EAt and ECt). The future
productivity of the child as an adult worker at time t + 1 is proportional to
the level of skill, St, produced using their own time and their parents￿time,
EA;C. There is no direct cost of skill production, the only cost is in terms of the




Ct , 0 < ￿ < 1: (12)
The scale factor AS captures the e¢ ciency of the skill production, or the school
quality: higher school quality results in a higher skill level achieved with the
same input of time. With this modi￿cation the production technology in the
traditional and in the modern sectors is now
qTt = AT [￿(St￿1NAt)
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)N
￿
Ct]
1=￿ ; qM = AMSt￿1NMt;
and the household income is
It = wAtSt￿1LAt + wCtLCt + ￿Tt + ￿Mt:
11The solution procedure is straightforward (see Appendix for the details). We
focus on the interior long-run, or steady-state equilibrium. In this equilibrium




1 + ￿(1 +  )
2 ￿=  + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(2￿ ￿ 1)
;
E￿




(1 ￿ ￿)(1 +  )
2 + (1 + ￿￿)(2 ￿ 1=￿) 
￿(1 +  )




AS￿ (1 ￿ ￿)!(2 ￿ 1=￿) 
￿(1 +  )
2 + (1 + (1 + ￿￿)(2 ￿ 1=￿)) =￿
;
and all other notations are the same as before.
The ￿gures below show how the amount of child labour (Fig. 2), schooling
(Fig. 3), and leisure (Fig. 4) change with ￿, for di⁄erent levels of schooling
quality; child labour without schooling is also shown for comparison. In the
presence of endogenous skill formation productivity growth causes an inverted
U-shape response in child labour. As the productivity gap between the tradi-
tional and the modern sectors shrinks (￿ increases) the amount of child labour
￿rst increases and then drops. A similar pattern is observed in children￿ s time
invested in schooling. Thus, the initial productivity growth in the traditional
sector results in a simultaneous increase in child labour and schooling compared
to the benchmark case without schooling. A higher school quality shifts the
turning point in both child labour and schooling toward the higher values of ￿.
For the values of ￿ close to zero an increase in school quality results in more
child labour and less schooling, i.e.the income e⁄ect of the productivity growth
dominates. For larger values of ￿ the substitution e⁄ect dominates, and an in-
crease in school quality causes child labour to drop and schooling time increase.
The results are shown for ￿ = ￿ = 1=2; similar patterns hold for a wide range
of parameter values.




















Fig.1. Child labour without schooling,
for ￿ = ￿1 (solid), ￿1=4 (dash),
and 3=4 (dot).



















Fig. 2. Child labour with schooling, for AS = 1=4
(solid), 1=2 (dash), and 3=4 (dot), and without
schooling (dash-dot), for ￿ = ￿1=4.



















Fig. 3. Child time in schooling, for AS = 1=4
(solid), 1=2 (dash), and 3=4 (dot) for ￿ = ￿1=4.






















Fig. 4. Child leisure, for AS = 1=4 (solid), 1=2
(dash), and 3=4 (dot) for ￿ = ￿1=4.
134 Conclusions
Persistence of child labour in the developing countries, together with the com-
monly accepted view on poverty as its main cause, suggests that child labour
will be eliminated with economic growth and development. There is, however,
empirical evidence of child labour being positively associated with economic
growth. In this paper we demonstrate, in a dual economy framework, how tech-
nological advancements in production can generate growth in the response of
child labour, and thus show that at least in the short run growth and develop-
ment can result in an increase in child labour. This has an important policy
implications: introduction of new technologies in the traditional sector, that
results in productivity and income growth, may at the same time cause an in-
crease in the number of children at work, by driving up the demand for child
labour. We also show, in the model with endogenous skill formation, that an
increase in schooling quality does reduce children￿ s time at work to some extent,
by making the future returns from education higher, but most of the increase
in schooling time occurs on the account of leisure: the model predicts that both
child labour and schooling may increase with productivity growth. Our results
are qualitatively consistent with the empirically observed patterns in the rela-
tionship between the amount of child labour and economic growth. In terms
of policy, the model suggests that measures towards increasing productivity in
either sector may bring about an undesired increase in child labour, and there-
fore must be complemented by measures towards improving the availability and
quality of schooling, to mitigate the possibility of this e⁄ect.
In the model borrowing and lending are assumed away. One straightforward
extension would be to introduce a possibility of borrowing by a household, at
an exogenously ￿xed interest rate, that would allow to invest more time in ed-
ucation and pay back the debt from the higher future earnings. Alternatively,
one could think of education having higher social than private returns, ￿say, by
a⁄ecting the total factor productivity, ￿and a relevant tax and subsidy policy
that would improve e¢ ciency in this situation. Also, higher future labour pro-
ductivity in our model is solely due to schooling, while it is possible that working
as a child means accumulating skills and experience that increase future labour
productivity as well. Varying the degree of complementarity of such learning-
by-doing and schooling can produce interesting predictions with regards to the
e⁄ect of policies towards reducing child labour. Another possible extension is
to consider an endogenous choice of innovation or a production technology by
entrepreneurs, and to explore in what conditions an entrepreneur would never
choose a technology that involves employing children.
A word of caution must be said about trying to take the model directly
to the data. The patterns in child labour across countries and regions and its
dynamics over time involves a vast range of factors, often unmeasureable or
not represented in the data, interacting in complicated ways. Our model is
deliberately stripped o⁄ many important factors, with the purpose of focussing
on the ambiguous e⁄ect of growth and development on child labour. The result
obtains even in this parsimonious setting, but should not be interpreted too
14literally. The main message to be taken is that new economic opportunities,
created by growth-enhancing policies, must be complemented by improvements
in schools quality, grants and subsidies to families with school-age children, and
other such measures policies encouraging education and preventing the growth
in child labour even in the short run.
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16A Appendix
A.1 Equilibrium without schooling
We focus on the set of the model parameters for which the equilibrium solution
is in the interior for each variable. In equilibrium the total output of the modern
and the traditional sectors equals the demand for the consumption good, so the
inverse demand is p =
I
Q
. Upon substitution into (5) and rearrangement we
obtain for the price and the quantities produced by each ￿rm





where the latter can also be rewritten as
qTcT = qMcM = I
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2: (16)
and for the pro￿ts of the ￿rms,
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2: (17)
In the equilibrium the labour market for both adult and child labour clears:
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:
17A.2 Equilibrium with both child labour and schooling





t [Ut + ￿t (It ￿ ptXt)
+ ￿t (1 ￿ ‘At ￿ LAt ￿ LA;Et) + ￿t (1 ￿ ‘Ct ￿ LCt ￿ LC;Et)];
and the ￿rst order conditions take the form
@Ut
@Xt




















￿ ￿￿t+1 ￿ 0
with complementary slackness conditions. We are interested in the interior





















For the production sector the optimization problem is static. Solving the cost






































and  t ￿ cMt=cTt. In the steady-state equilibrium wages and outputs grow at
the same constant rate, so that their ratios are constant, and the labour inputs
are constant. From now on we drop the time index.
18The ￿rst order conditions of the household optimization problem together
with the budget constraint can be rewritten as
1 ￿ LC ￿ EC =
￿I
wC




1 ￿ LA ￿ EA =
(1 ￿ ￿)I
SwA






In equilibrium labour market clears,
NA + NM = LA; NC = LC;




  (2 ￿ 1=￿)
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2: (23)
Combining these with (22) and using
@S
@EC










we obtain, upon obvious rearrangements,
wAS = I
"
1 ￿ ￿ +
  (1 + ￿￿)(2￿ ￿ 1)
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and upon collecting the terms and using (23) and (24),
S￿ = AS￿￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1￿￿ !1￿￿  
2 + 1=(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 +  )
2 + (1 + ￿￿)
￿
 
2 + 1=(1 ￿ ￿)
￿:
Using the notation & = !S the last expression can be rewritten as
&￿ =
AS￿￿




2 + 1=(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 +  )
2 + (1 + ￿￿)
￿
 
2 + 1=(1 ￿ ￿)
￿;
where ! is de￿ned in (21), and from (24)-(25)
& =
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 +  )
2 + (1 + ￿￿)
￿
 
2 + 1=(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
￿(1 +  )
2 + 1=￿ + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
:
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